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Secrecy vs. Disclosure of the Intelligence Community Budget:
An Enduring Debate
Anne Daugherty Miles1
Democracies are not strangers to secrets. Protecting secrets 
when appropriate, disclosing secrets when proper, and 
managing secrecy are all normal parts of the democratic 
process. (Berkowitz 2003)2
Abstract
Little-known US congressional documents, dating from the 1970s, debate 
public disclosure of Intelligence Community (IC) budget. The documents 
offer a rich repository of the arguments on both sides of the debate and 
shine a light on the thoughtful, measured congressional oversight practiced 
in formative years of the House and Senate intelligence committees.
Keywords
disclosure, intelligence, Intelligence Community, oversight, public 
participation, national security, transparency, U.S. budget, U.S. Congress
As Bruce Berkowitz points out in the opening quote, democracies are 
seldom synonymous with complete transparency. Democratic governments 
must routinely reconcile the demands of national security against the ideals 
of a completely open government. There is no one universal model for how 
to oversee the most secret aspects of a nation’s national security 
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establishment.3 And there are no universal guidelines on what should be 
secret and what should be in the public domain.
In the United States, congressional overseers act as a surrogate 
American public. A number of provisions in the U.S. Constitution, expounded
upon by Supreme Court rulings, public laws, and congressional rules, grant 
Congress the authority, as a coequal branch of government, to oversee and 
investigate executive and judicial branch activities.4
Within this context, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) - operating 
in secret, concealed from public scrutiny - is overseen by a number of 
intelligence-related congressional committees.5 Remarks made by 
Representative Edward Boland in 1978, when he was Chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), reflect his sense of 
the tension between the public’s right to know and the risk that such 
knowledge - in the hands of the nation’s enemies—could undermine the 
country’s very existence:
On the one hand, we have a commission from the House to bring 
about the credibility and accountability in the U.S. intelligence 
community. Against this, we must measure the possible damage to 
national security that could result from any unwise action by the 
Congress. We simply do not want to arm our adversaries with weapons
of our own manufacture. So, we seek a balance between open 
government and the protection of the national security.6
Many congressional committees have jurisdictional claims to oversight 
on IC-related topics, not only because IC elements are embedded in a 
number of separate Cabinet departments and agencies within the executive 
2
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branch, but also because some IC-related topics challenge fundamental and 
overarching principles within the jurisdiction of many committees, such as 
privacy and human rights.7 However, based on House and Senate rules, only
the House and Senate Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations 
Committees may either authorize or appropriate funding for IC programs. 
These six committees conduct the majority of the day-to-day oversight of IC
programs and activities. Their oversight focuses on particular programs as 
well as general policies. These are the six committees most relevant to the 
debate over disclosure of intelligence-related spending.
There is occasional disagreement between the executive branch and 
congressional overseers over what information should be in the public 
domain. Disclosure of all or some of the IC budget is one such area of 
disagreement and has been debated for decades. At present, statute dictates
that only the National Intelligence Program (NIP) topline figure must be 
publicly disclosed.8 The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is not required
to disclose any other information concerning the NIP budget, whether the 
information concerns particular intelligence agencies or particular 
intelligence programs. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense began disclosing 
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) appropriations figures on an annual basis
and in 2011 disclosed those figures back to 2007.9 These actions have 
provided public access to previously classified budget numbers for national 
and military intelligence activities. Intelligence-related spending has 
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remained relatively constant over the past decade - representing roughly 10 
percent of national defense spending.10 For those unfamiliar with the NIP and
MIP, a brief background on the two programs is provided at the end of this 
article.11
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) were established in 
1976 and 1977, respectively, to better integrate (not replace) the interests, 
responsibilities, and depth of intelligence-related expertise of all the 
intelligence-related standing committees, and to respond to the perceptions 
of widespread abuse by certain intelligence agencies.12 The overarching goal 
was vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States.13
With the creation of the HPSCI and SSCI, authorization of the funds 
associated with what was then known as the National Foreign Intelligence 
Program (NFIP) became part of each year’s Intelligence Authorization Act 
(IAA).14 U.S. congressional documents from the 1970s provide a rich 
repository of the arguments voiced in favor of, or in opposition to, disclosing 
the intelligence budget. At that time, the debates typically focused on 
whether to disclose one NFIP top-line number, or whether to disclose all IC 
agency top-line numbers.
Good arguments existed on both sides of the disclosure debate, and 
then, as now, there was no one right answer, which is why the debate is an 
4
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enduring one. Available literature is usually one-sided - typically arguing for 
more transparency. It is difficult for those interested in this subject to find 
any authoritative sources that discuss both sides of the disclosure debate in 
a comprehensive and meaningful way. This article suggests several sources- 
little known and publicly available, and dating from the 1970s - that provide 
a number of insights into the perspectives of those on both sides of the 
issue. Unfortunately, few know the topic was debated in the 1970s and that 
these documents—capturing the details of the discussion - even exist. Many 
of the arguments remain germane to today’s disclosure debate. The 
suggested congressional documents include:
1. Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities of the 
United States is in the Public Interest, Hearings, and Senate Report 
95-274, both published by the SSCI in 1977;15 and
2. Disclosure of Funds For Intelligence Activities, Hearings (no report) 
published by the HPSCI in 1978.16
These documents contain the testimony and views of a number of 
individuals from the legal, intelligence, legislative, and public interest group 
communities. The witness list included then-Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI) Stansfield Turner, former DCIs William Colby and Richard Helms, 
former DIA Director Daniel Graham; Senators William Proxmire and Barry 
Goldwater, Congressman Michael Harrington, University of Chicago Law 
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Professor Gerhard Casper; Yale Law School Professor Thomas Emerson; and 
many others.
In 1977, at the conclusion of its internal debate, the SSCI voted 9-8 in
favor of disclosure of the topline NFIP number. The HPSCI, however, 
reported that it had found “no persuasive reason why disclosure of any or all
amounts of the funds authorized for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the Government would be in the public interest.”17 In its passage 
of the IAA for Fiscal Year 1979, Congress did not require public disclosure of 
the IC budget topline. The remainder of this article summarizes some of the 
major arguments made for and against disclosure in the congressional 
documents suggested above and summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Disclosure of Intelligence-Related Spending: Arguments For and 
Against
Argument Disclosure (Transparency) Non-Disclosure (Secrecy)
“Right to Know”?
Constitution Yes, based on Article 1, Section 9, 
Clause 7: “No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury but in 
Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law; and a regular 
Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all 
public Money shall be published 
from time to time.”
No, based on Article 1, Section 5, 
Clause 3: “Each House shall keep 
a Journal of its Proceedings, and 
from time to time publish the 
same, excepting such Parts as 
may in their Judgment require 
Secrecy.”
Congressional Oversight as 
Substitute for Public 
Participation?
Sufficient 
substitute for 
public 
participation?
No, “Congressional oversight is not 
a complete substitute for public 
participation.” 
Yes, “[P]ublic interest in 
disclosure is satisfied by 
congressional oversight of 
intelligence expenditures.” 
6
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Argument Disclosure (Transparency) Non-Disclosure (Secrecy)
Enhanced Understanding, 
Legitimacy, and Efficiency for 
IC?
Understanding Enhanced: Allows public to make 
rough judgments about the relative 
priorities of their government and 
helps to eliminate inaccurate 
speculation about amount of money
used for intelligence activities.
No Benefit: Public no better off in 
its ability to make informed 
judgments on intelligence-related 
spending.
Legitimacy and
public 
confidence
Enhanced: Evidence of U.S. 
commitment to national and 
collective security.
Undermined: Transparency 
demonstrates an inability to 
function effectively in our own 
national defense.
Efficiency Enhanced: “Constructive criticism 
requires access to information.”
No Change: Oversight by 
congressional intelligence 
committees sufficiently in-depth 
to satisfy those concerned about 
IC’s efficient use of taxpayer 
dollars.
Necessary to Protect National 
Security?
Conspicuous 
Bump theory 
Not persuasive: Too many possible 
explanations for the bump to 
determine the precise cause.
Persuasive: Careful analysis of 
changes in the aggregate figure 
reveals ‘bumps’ caused by the 
introduction of new and significant
programs.
Slippery Slope 
theory 
Not persuasive: Release of detailed 
information will not harm national 
security, and/or demands for more 
information can be resisted.
Persuasive: Disclosure will result 
in irresistible demands for more 
detailed information, the 
disclosure of which would be 
damaging to national security.
Source: Miles, based primarily on U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(1977).18
A Constitutional “Right to Know”?
Demands for greater IC budget transparency often use the 
Constitution for justification. At issue is Article I, section 9, clause 7, which 
reads: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time 
to time.”
7
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In 1977, proponents of transparency, such as Gerhard Casper, 
Professor of Law, University of Chicago, argued that clause 7 requires 
disclosure that is “both meaningful and accurate. An accounting so broad 
that it fails to convey useful information to the public, or so inaccurate as to 
be misleading...would not meet constitutional requirements” (4).19 In similar 
fashion, Senator Birch Bayh stated his belief that “where the Constitution 
imposes a specific duty, then we must make every possible effort to perform
it.” Bayh's full statement reads as follows:
Where the Constitution is silent we have greater leeway to choose a 
proper course of action. But where the Constitution imposes a specific 
duty, then we must make every possible effort to perform it. In other 
words, if there are to be secret expenditures, the secrecy must be 
justified on the grounds of compelling necessity and not just 
convenience or utility. The constitutionality of our action may depend 
on whether we seriously consider alternatives which would, without 
endangering national security, fully satisfy one of the fundamental 
principles of free government-the peoples’ right to know.20
Proponents of non-disclosure (secrecy) countered that Clause 7 “does 
not require public disclosure of the aggregate authorization or appropriation 
figure, nor does it require publication of an account of the expenditures of 
the intelligence agencies, individually or as a whole.”21 Several witnesses 
testified that “Congress has plenary power [implied authority] in interpreting
the requirements of this constitutional provision and therefore can 
constitutionally withhold this figure from the public.”22
8
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Proponents of non-disclosure also argued that the principle of secrecy23
was acknowledged by Founding Fathers in the Constitution’s Journal Secrecy
Clause - Article 1, Section 5, Clause 3:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to 
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either 
House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those 
Present, be entered on the Journal.24
The Senate Report noted that the Constitution “provides explicitly for 
secrecy in the congressional journals, but no such exception is included in 
the publication requirement of article I, section 9, clause 7.”25 It also noted 
that “the United States informs its electorate, in great detail, of expenditures
for sensitive activities such as defense.”26 
Congressional Oversight as Substitute for Public Participation?
Several senators pointed out that the public’s “right to know” was well-
served by the “abundance of responsible oversight” in the Congress. They 
stated:  
At least fifty members of the Congress are now privy to some level of 
detail concerning intelligence operations. The number of congressional 
staff persons involved are at least double that figure. The intelligence 
community’s budget has undergone a line-by-line analysis by this 
committee and votes have been taken with respect to specific 
intelligence operations. Some budgetary proposals have been rejected 
by the committee. Several committees are notified in advance of every
contemplated covert action. And a detailed report on all the 
intelligence agencies’ activities and plans, as well as a detailed 
accounting of the committee’s recommendations for authorized 
amounts, has been made available to every Member of the Senate. We
believe that this constitutes an abundance of responsible oversight.27 
9
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The Senate Report acknowledged the strengths of the oversight 
structure but acknowledged that “congressional oversight is not a complete 
substitute for public participation”: 
While budgetary oversight has increased dramatically, congressional 
oversight is not a complete substitute for public participation. Congress
and the Executive may secretly agree on intelligence expenditures, but
the public has a right to know as much as possible about such 
decisions consistent with national security interests. Only if the public 
has such knowledge can it judge how the executive branch and the 
Congress utilize funds and oversee intelligence activities.28
Increased Understanding, Legitimacy and Efficiency for IC?
A number of witnesses argued that a more transparent IC budget 
could potentially eliminate misperceptions and also increase public 
confidence in the legitimacy of intelligence-related government activities.29 If 
there was full disclosure, “the public would be able to weigh spending for 
intelligence against expenditures for health, education, or a particular 
weapon system.”30 For example, then-DCI Turner testified:
[D]isclosure would help the public “put into perspective the intelligence
activity of their country.” It would allow the American public to make 
rough judgments about the relative priorities of their government as 
seen in governmental expenditures, eliminate harmful speculation 
about amount of money used for intelligence activities, and help to 
restore public confidence in the legitimacy of such activities. Such 
disclosure would also eliminate misconceptions about the uses of funds
appropriated to the Department of Defense.31
Some proponents of disclosure argued that “publishing an aggregate 
figure for intelligence activities on the basis of constitutional and policy 
arguments would be a reflection of the qualities that distinguish our 
10
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democracy from all other nations.”32 Senator Adlai Stevenson argued that 
“disclosure of the aggregate figure will reassure large parts of the world now
doubting U.S. resolve. It is evidence of a continuing U.S. commitment to 
national and collective security.”33
Senator Proxmire argued that greater scrutiny would “increase the 
likelihood of a more efficient government. Public criticism leading to 
improvements cannot take place in a vacuum; such constructive criticism 
requires access to information.”34 However, a number of proponents of non-
disclosure argued that “disclosure would provide little benefit to the public. 
Without detailed knowledge of expenditures the public would not be in any 
better position than at present to make informed judgments on 
governmental spending for intelligence.”35 Senator Chaffee, and others, 
stated:
Neither this Nation nor any other country in the world has ever 
embarked upon this dangerous path. It is a course which is neither 
required under our Constitution nor consistent with sound 
commonsense. It would serve no useful public purpose and would 
undermine the confidence of our own people and that of our allies in 
our ability to function effectively in our own national defense.36
Secrecy Necessary to National Security?
The Senate Report discusses the “conspicuous bump” theory - the 
argument that an analysis of changes in the aggregate figure reveal bumps, 
or increases, caused by the introduction of new and significant programs 
that when combined with other information known to adversaries, could 
11
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undermine national security. Former DCI Colby, for example, argued that 
the introduction of the U-2 caused such a bump in the CIA’s budget. This 
bump, if the CIA budget had been public, might have alerted the Soviet 
Union, enabling it to prepare countermeasures.37
The Senate Report concluded that disclosure of the much larger IC 
budget was less susceptible to bumps than the smaller budget of the CIA, 
and that there had been no bumps in the aggregate figure for the IC during 
the last decade.38 It decided that “changes in the aggregate figure over time 
would not reveal trends as there are simply too many variables involved to 
be able to determine the cause of any changes.”39 Furthermore:
The committee was influenced in this by the President’s decision not to
object to disclosure on national security grounds and by his willingness
to disclose the figure. No witness suggested that this one-time 
disclosure of funds appropriated for intelligence activities would be 
damaging to the national security. Those who had the burden of 
demonstrating damage to national security from such disclosure 
failed.40
The Senate Report also discusses the “slippery slope” theory - an 
argument made by those who believe that disclosure of one aggregate 
number results in irresistible demands for more detailed information.41 
Several senators summarized the slippery slope theory this way:
We are concerned that once we start down the road of publishing 
intelligence appropriation figures, we will be faced with irresistible 
demands from those who insist upon knowing more. ... History has 
demonstrated how disclosure of one figure invariably leads to 
revelation of more. Former DCI Colby recalled: “In 1947 the Atomic 
Energy Commission account for our then-secret atomic weapons 
program was felt to be so sensitive that only a one-line item was 
placed in the budget that year to account for all such weapons 
12
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expenditures. In theory many of these expenditures are still secret, 
but that one-line item by 1974 had expanded to 15 pages of detailed 
explanation of the Atomic Energy Commission’s weapons programs. I 
could only foresee a similar erosion of the secrecy which will be 
necessary to successful intelligence operations in the future.” We urge 
the Senate not to take the first step down a similar path.42 
Then-DCI Turner countered, “I think we can hold the line at one figure 
almost as well as we can hold it at zero figures.”43
Summary
In sum, those in favor of disclosure (greater transparency) tended to 
argue that:
 It is constitutionally mandated, citing Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7; 
 It can potentially eliminate misperceptions about the IC and increase 
confidence in the IC and funds spent on its behalf; 
 It allows for greater scrutiny of intelligence-related spending beyond a 
few congressional overseers; and
 It will not harm national security, because (1) knowing how much a 
program costs tells you nothing about capabilities, and (2) demands 
for more information can be resisted.
Those in favor of non-disclosure tended to argue that:
 It is constitutionally mandated, citing Article 1, Section 5, Clause 3; 
 The scrutiny of congressional overseers is in-depth and sufficient; 
 Disclosure will harm national security because (1) if the enemy knows 
the specifics of where intelligence dollars are being spent, it will also 
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know where those dollars are not being spent, and may direct its 
efforts toward that perceived vulnerability;44 and (2) demands for more
and more information will be relentless.
A Question of Balance
The disclosure debate has been rekindled a number of times in the 
years following Senate Report 95-274. Most recently, H.R. 2272, and an 
identical bill, S. 1307, both titled the “Intelligence Budget Transparency Act 
of 2015,” were introduced in the House and Senate respectively on May 12, 
2015.45 Both bills require disclosure of the top-line budget figure associated 
with each IC component. The bills add a new topic to the debate: projected 
appropriations for the next four fiscal years. They require release of “the 
total dollar amount proposed in the budget for intelligence or intelligence 
related activities of each element of the Government engaged in such 
activities in the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the 
estimated appropriation required for each of the ensuing four fiscal years.”46 
Neither bill has passed, in large part because the Congress continues to 
grapple with the same basic question the Congress grappled with four 
decades ago: “Even if disclosure would assist the public, would it be so 
damaging to the national security as to require continued secrecy in this 
area?”47 Before attempting to change the current status quo, it may be useful
14
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for all parties in the debate to revisit the arguments voiced in 1977 and 
1978.
Appendix: 
Brief Background on the National and Military Intelligence Programs
Origins of an intelligence budget—separate and distinct from the 
defense budget—date back to reforms initiated in the 1970s to improve 
oversight and accountability of the IC. Since that time, IC programs have 
been grouped, for the most part, under two labels: (1) the national, which 
covers the programs, projects, and activities of the IC oriented toward the 
strategic needs of decision makers; and (2) military or tactical, which funds 
defense intelligence activities intended to support tactical military operations
and priorities. The two programs are managed and overseen separately.
Until 2004, the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) was 
managed by the DCI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. The 
term “NIP” was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (P.L. 109-458 §1074). The IRTPA deleted “Foreign” from
NFIP and created the position of DNI. The DNI was given greater budgetary 
authority in conjunction with the NIP than the DCI had in conjunction with 
the NFIP.48 The NIP funds the CIA and the strategic-level intelligence 
activities associated with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
15
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Until 1994, military-specific tactical and/or operational intelligence 
activities were referred to as Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities 
(TIARA) and were managed separately by the Secretary of Defense. TIARA 
referred to the intelligence activities “of a single service” that were 
considered “organic” (meaning “to belong to”) military units and addressed a
unique DOD requirement. In 1994, a new category was created, called the 
Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) for defense-wide intelligence 
programs. A DOD memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense in 2005 
merged TIARA and JMIP to create the MIP, and outlined the role of Under 
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) as its program executive.49
16
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